Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence? by Helfer, Laurence R.
Minnesota Intellectual Property Review 
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 2 
2003 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence? 
Laurence R. Helfer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst 
Recommended Citation 
Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 47 (2003). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol5/iss1/2 
The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the 
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing. 
 47 
 
 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict 
or Coexistence? 
Laurence R. Helfer** 
I.  INTRODUCTION: CONFLICT OR COEXISTENCE? 
Human rights and intellectual property, two bodies of law 
that were once strangers, are now becoming increasingly 
intimate bedfellows.  For decades the two subjects developed in 
virtual isolation from each other.  But in the last few years, 
international standard setting activities have begun to map 
previously uncharted intersections between intellectual 
property law on the one hand and human rights law on the 
other. 
Exactly how this new-found relationship will evolve is 
being actively studied – and sometimes even fought over – by 
states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in 
international venues such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), the U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
World Health Organization (WHO), and the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  A 
review of the lawmaking underway in these fora reveals two 
distinct conceptual approaches to the human rights-intellectual 
property interface.  These two approaches are premised upon 
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radically different normative foundations and they offer 
divergent prescriptions for how to structure the rights and 
obligations of nation states and private parties. 
The first approach views human rights and intellectual 
property as being in fundamental conflict.1  This framing sees 
strong intellectual property protection as undermining – and 
therefore as incompatible with – a broad spectrum of human 
rights obligations, especially in the area of economic, social, and 
cultural rights.2  The prescription that proponents of this 
approach advocate for resolving this conflict is to recognize the 
normative primacy of human rights law over intellectual 
property law in areas where specific treaty obligations conflict.3 
The second approach to the intersection of human rights 
and intellectual property sees both areas of law as concerned 
with the same fundamental question: defining the appropriate 
scope of private monopoly power that gives authors and 
inventors a sufficient incentive to create and innovate, while 
ensuring that the consuming public has adequate access to the 
fruits of their efforts.  This school views human rights law and 
 
 1. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Res. 2000/7, 
U.N. Sub-Comm’n. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd 
Sess., pmbl. ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 [hereinafter Resolution 
2000/7] (stating that “actual or potential conflicts exist between the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights”). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. at ¶ 3 (emphasizing “the primacy of human rights obligations 
over economic policies and agreements”).  Statements by legal commentators 
and NGOs also advocate the primacy of human rights over economic 
agreements, including those relating to intellectual property rights.  Notably, 
these assertions of primacy are not limited to jus cogens or peremptory norms, 
which are hierarchically superior to other international law obligations.  See, 
e.g., ROBERT HOWSE & MAKAU MUTUA, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Int’l 
Centre for Human Rights & Democratic Dev., Policy Paper, 2000), available at 
http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/wtoRightsGl
ob.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2003) (“Human rights, to the extent they are 
obligations erga omnes, or have the status of custom, or of general principles, 
will normally prevail over specific, conflicting provisions of treaties such as 
trade agreements.”); RICHARD ELLIOTT, TRIPS AND RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, ACCESS TO MEDICINES, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE WTO AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 (Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network & AIDS Law 
Project, South Africa, 2001), available at www.aidslaw.ca (asserting that 
because “States’ binding legal obligations to realize human rights have 
primacy in international law,” obligations under TRIPS “must be recognized 
as not binding to the extent there is a conflict with [states’] human rights 
obligations”). 
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intellectual property law as essentially compatible, although 
often disagreeing over where to strike the balance between 
incentives on the one hand and access on the other.4 
Before further exploring the implications of these two 
approaches to mapping the human rights-intellectual property 
interface, it is first useful to step back in time to see just how 
isolated these two issue areas of international law were from 
each other and what has caused the recent erosion of that 
isolation. 
II. HISTORICAL ISOLATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES 
It is something of a mystery why intellectual property and 
human rights have remained strangers for so long.  No less 
than human rights law’s foundational document – the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights – protects authors’ 
“moral and material interests” in their “scientific, literary or 
artistic production[s]” as part of its catalogue of fundamental 
liberties.5  In the mid-1960s, a similar clause was included in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), which has now been ratified by nearly 150 
 
 4. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Report of the 
Secretary-General, ESCOR Sub-Comm’n. on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, 52nd Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4 at 8 , U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12 (2001) (submission by WTO asserting that existing 
international agreements permit states sufficient room to balance intellectual 
property and human rights standards, but noting that “[h]uman rights can be 
used -- and have been and are currently being used -- to argue in favour of 
balancing the system either upwards or downwards by means of adjusting the 
existing [intellectual property] rights or by creating new rights”); 
Globalization, TRIPS and Access to Pharmaceuticals, WHO POLICY 
PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICINES (World Health Organization), No. 3, Mar. 2001, 
at 5 [hereinafter WHO Policy Perspectives] (asserting that “[a]cess to essential 
drugs is a human right” but urging states to use existing “safeguards” within 
TRIPS to “enhance the affordability and availability” of patented medicines); 
The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights on Human Rights: Report of the High Commissioner, ESCOR Sub. 
Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., 
Provisional Agenda Item 4 at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001) 
[hereinafter High Commissioner Report] (stating that “[t]he balance between 
public and private interests found under article 15 [of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] -- and article 27 of the 
Universal Declaration -- is one familiar to intellectual property law” but 
asserting that the key question “is where to strike the right balance”). 
 5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
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nations.6  Yet for years, intellectual property remained a 
normative backwater in the human rights pantheon, neglected 
by treaty bodies, experts, and commentators while other rights 
emerged from the jurisprudential shadows.7 
Nor was human rights law’s nominal interest in 
intellectual property reciprocated by the intellectual property 
regime.  No references to human rights appear in the major 
intellectual property treaties such as the Paris and Berne 
Conventions, or in the more recently adopted TRIPS 
Agreement.8  These treaties do refer to the protections granted 
to authors and inventors as “rights.”9  But the principal 
justification for these agreements lies not in deontological 
claims about inalienable liberties, but rather in economic and 
instrumental benefits that flow from protecting intellectual 
property products across national borders.10 
 
 6. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 15(1)(b) & 15(1)(c), S. EXEC. DOC. D, 95-2, at 18, 
(1977), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 9 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR] 
(recognizing the right “to benefit from the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which 
he is the author” and “to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications”).  As of October 2003, 147 states were parties to the ICESCR, 
111 of whom were also WTO members.  See Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal 
International Human Rights Treaties (as of Oct. 10, 2003), at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). 
 7. See Audrey R. Chapman, A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual 
Property, Scientific Progress, and Access to the Benefits of Science, Panel 
Discussion on Intellectual Property and Human Rights at 3 (Nov. 9, 1998) 
(characterizing ICESCR Article 15 as “the most neglected set of the provisions 
within an international human rights instrument whose norms are not well 
developed”), at http://www.wipo.int/globalissues/activities/1998/humanrights/ 
papers/pdf/chapman.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2003). 
 8. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS–RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, last 
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 
[hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 
1161 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 9. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at pmbl. (“recognizing that 
intellectual property rights are private rights”). 
 10. For a discussion of this distinction, see Laurence R. Helfer, 
Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPs Agreement, The Case for a 
European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357, 397-99 (1998) 
[hereinafter Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims]. 
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What accounts for this jurisprudential separation?  In part, 
the answer is that both bodies of law were preoccupied with 
more important issues, and neither saw the other as either 
aiding or threatening its sphere of influence or opportunities 
for expansion. 
During the decades following World War II, the most 
pressing concern for the human rights community was 
elaborating and codifying legal norms and enhancing 
monitoring mechanisms.11  This evolutionary process resulted 
in a de facto separation of human rights into categories, 
ranging from a core set of peremptory norms for the most 
egregious forms of state misconduct, to civil and political rights, 
to economic, social and cultural rights.12  Among these 
categories, economic, social, and cultural rights are the least 
well developed and the least prescriptive, having received 
significant jurisprudential attention only in the last decade.13 
For advocates of intellectual property protection, by 
contrast, the central focus of international lawmaking was 
twofold: first, the gradual expansion of subject matters and 
rights through periodic revisions to the Berne, Paris and other 
conventions, and later, the creation of a link between 
intellectual property and trade.14  Human rights law added 
little to these two enterprises.  It provided neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient justification for strong, state-granted 
intellectual property monopolies (whether bundled with trade 
rules or not).  Nor, conversely, did it function as a potential 
check on the expansion of intellectual property law. 
III. TWO HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION EMERGE 
It was the human rights community that first took notice 
of intellectual property law.  Two events caused intellectual 
property to be placed on the agenda for human rights 
 
 11. See Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 285, 296-301 (1999) (discussing evolution of UN human rights 
system and its monitoring mechanisms). 
 12. See Theodor Meron, Norm Making and Supervision in International 
Human Rights: Reflections on Institutional Order, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 754 
(1982). 
 13. See MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS 
DEVELOPMENT (Oxford Univ. Press) (1995). 
 14. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8. 
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lawmaking.  The first was an emphasis on the neglected rights 
of indigenous peoples.15  The second was the consequence of 
linking of intellectual property and trade through the TRIPS 
Agreement.16  Both of these events exposed the serious 
normative deficiencies of intellectual property law from a 
human rights perspective.17  Furthermore, both prompted 
responses and new lawmaking initiatives that generated a 
growing tension between the conflict and the coexistence 
approaches to defining the human rights and intellectual 
property interface. 
A. THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
Beginning in the early 1990s, the U.N. human rights 
machinery began to devote significant attention to the rights of 
indigenous communities.18  Among the many claims that these 
peoples demanded from states was the right to recognition of 
and control over their culture, including traditional knowledge 
relating to biodiversity, medicines, and agriculture.19  From an 
intellectual property perspective, much of this knowledge was 
treated as part of the public domain, either because it did not 
meet established subject matter criteria for protection, or 
because the indigenous communities who created it did not 
endorse private ownership rules.20  But by treating traditional 
knowledge as effectively un-owned, intellectual property law 
made that knowledge available for unrestricted exploitation by 
outsiders.21  Many of these outsiders used this knowledge as an 
upstream input for later downstream innovations that were 
themselves privatized through patents, copyrights, and plant 
 
 15. See infra Part III.A. 
 16. See infra Part III.B. 
 17. For a more detailed discussion of these events and an analysis of their 
significance from the perspective of international relations theory, see 
Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New 
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L 
L. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Helfer, Regime Shifting]. 
 18. See Erica-Irene Daes, Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples, 95 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 143, 147 (2001). 
 19. See id. at 146. 
 20. See Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional 
Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 238 (2001) (“TK [traditional 
knowledge] is often (and conveniently) assumed to be in the public domain.  
This is likely to encourage the presumption that nobody is harmed and no 
rules are broken when research institutions and corporations use it freely.”). 
 21. See id. at 247. 
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breeders’ rights.22  Adding insult to injury, the financial and 
technological benefits of those innovations were rarely shared 
with indigenous communities.23 
U.N. human rights bodies sought to close this hole in the 
fabric of intellectual property law by commissioning a working 
group and a special rapporteur to create a Draft Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,24 and Principles and 
Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous 
People.25  These documents adopt a skeptical approach to 
 
 22. See id. at 243-49 (explaining how discoveries in traditional knowledge 
have been used by different intellectual property industries); see also 
LAURENCE R. HELFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PLANT VARIETIES: 
AN OVERVIEW WITH OPTIONS FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 9 (FAO Legal 
Papers On Line No. 31, 2002), at http://www.fao.org/Legal/pub-e.htm (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2003) (discussing proposals to require intellectual property 
owners to share benefits with indigenous communities and farmers in 
developing countries). 
 23. See Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Written Statements 
Submitted by International Indian Treaty Council, a Non-Governmental 
Organization in Special Consultative Status, U.N. ESCOR Comm’n on Human 
Rights, 59th Sess., Agenda Item 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/NGO/127 (2003): 
The theft and patenting of Indigenous Peoples’ bio-genetic resources 
is facilitated by [TRIPS].  Some of the plants which Indigenous 
Peoples have discovered, cultivated, and used for food, medicine, and 
for sacred ceremonies since time immemorial have already been 
patented in the United States, Japan and Europe.  A few examples of 
these are ayahuasca, quinoa, and sangre de drago in South America; 
Kava in the Pacific; turmeric and bitter melon in Asia. 
There are some exceptions, however, particularly in the form of so-called 
bioprospecting agreements between indigenous groups and entities in the 
developed world.  For a discussion of these agreements and references to the 
literature, see CHARLES R. MCMANIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GENETIC 
RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION: THINKING 
GLOBALLY, ACTING LOCALLY (Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, Faculty Working 
Papers Series No. 02-10-03, 2002). 
 24. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Technical Review of 
United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. 
ESCOR Comm’n. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n. on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 15, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994). 
 25. See Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Protection of the 
Heritage of Indigenous People, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. 
ESCOR Sub-Comm’n. on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 
(1995) (initial text of Draft Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the 
Heritage of Indigenous People); Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Report 
of the Seminar on the Draft Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the 
Heritage of Indigenous People, U.N. ESCOR Sub-Comm’n. on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/26 (2000) [hereinafter Revised Draft Principles and 
Guidelines] (revised text of the draft Principles and Guidelines).  The Sub-
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intellectual property protection.  On the one hand, the 
documents urge states to protect traditional knowledge using 
legal mechanisms that fit comfortably within existing 
intellectual property paradigms – such as allowing indigenous 
communities to seek an injunction and damages for 
unauthorized uses.26  But the documents also define protectable 
subject matter more broadly than existing intellectual property 
law, and they urge states to deny patents, copyrights, and other 
exclusive rights over “any element of indigenous peoples’ 
heritage” that does not provide for “sharing of ownership, 
control, use and benefits” with those peoples.27  In short, when 
indigenous culture is analyzed from a human rights 
perspective, intellectual property rules are seen as one of the 
problems facing indigenous communities and – only perhaps – 
as part of a solution to those problems. 
B. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The second area of intersection between human rights and 
intellectual property relates to the TRIPS Agreement, adopted 
in 1994 as part of the World Trade Organization.28  TRIPS 
adopted relatively high minimum standards of protection for all 
WTO members, including many developing and least developed 
states whose previous commitment to patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks was nonexistent or at best equivocal.29  And unlike 
earlier intellectual property agreements, TRIPS has teeth.30  
Non-compliance with the treaty can be challenged through the 
WTO’s hard-edged dispute settlement system, in which rulings 
by WTO panels and Appellate Body are backed up by the threat 
 
Commission later adopted the Revised Draft Principles and Guidelines and 
transmitted them to the Commission on Human Rights for its approval.  See 
Draft Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous 
Peoples, Decision 2000/107, U.N. Sub-Comm’n. on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/DEC/2000/107 (2000). 
 26. See Revised Draft Principles and Guidelines, supra note 25, at 23(b) 
(national laws to protect indigenous peoples’ heritage should provide the 
means for indigenous peoples to prevent and obtain damages for “the 
acquisition, documentation or use of their heritage without proper 
authorization of the traditional owners”). 
 27. Id. at 23(c). 
 28. See supra note 8. 
 29. For a review of the changes TRIPS wrought, see J.H. Reichman, The 
TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing 
Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441 (2000). 
 30. See id. at 443-47. 
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of trade sanctions.31 
The U.N. human rights system turned its attention to 
TRIPS in 2000, just when the treaty’s transitional periods were 
expiring for developing countries.32  In August of that year, the 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights adopted Resolution 2000/7 on Intellectual Property 
Rights and Human Rights.33  The resolution adopts an 
antagonistic approach to TRIPS.  It stresses that “actual or 
potential conflicts exist between the implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights.”34  These conflicts cut across an exceptionally 
wide swath of legal terrain, including: (1) the transfer of 
technology to developing countries; (2) the consequences for the 
right to food of plant breeders’ rights and patenting of 
genetically modified organisms; (3) bio-piracy; (4) control of 
indigenous communities’ natural resources and culture; and (5) 
the impact on the right to health from restrictions on access to 
patented pharmaceuticals.35 
To address these conflicts, the Sub-Commission set out an 
ambitious new agenda for reviewing intellectual property 
issues within the United Nations,36 an agenda animated by the 
 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 442. 
 33. Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1.  For a discussion of the Resolution’s 
history, see David Weissbrodt & Kell Schoff, A Human Rights Approach to 
Intellectual Property Protection: The Genesis and Application of Sub-
Commission Resolution 2000/7, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (forthcoming 
2003). 
 34. Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, at pmbl. ¶ 11. 
 35. See id.  See also id. at ¶ 2 (identifying conflicts between TRIPS and 
“the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications, the right to health, the right to food and the right to self-
determination”). 
 36. The Sub-Commission requested four different sets of actors – national 
governments, intergovernmental organizations, U.N. human rights bodies, 
and NGOs – to address the intersection of human rights and intellectual 
property.  It asked national lawmakers to integrate “human rights obligations 
and principles” into their activities, with a particular focus on the social 
function of intellectual property.  Id. at ¶ 5.  Similar exhortations were 
directed to intergovernmental organizations, whom the Sub-Commission in 
effect urged to act as watch dogs of TRIPS by “deepen[ing] their analysis of the 
impacts” of the treaty and its human rights implications.  Id. at ¶¶ 6, 12.  The 
Sub-Commission’s most detailed requests were aimed at other U.N. human 
rights bodies, whom it asked to clarify the relationship between intellectual 
property and human rights.  Id. at ¶¶ 9-11 (requesting action by the High 
Commissioner, the CESCR, and the Special Rapporteurs on Globalization).  
Finally, to ensure visibility for its new agenda, the Sub-Commission 
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principle that human rights must be given “primacy . . . over 
economic policies and agreements.”37  In the two and a half 
years since this resolution, the U.N. human rights system has 
responded enthusiastically to the Sub-Commission’s invitation 
by devoting unprecedented attention to intellectual property 
issues.  Among the most important actions have been: (1) three 
resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights on “Access to 
Medication in the Context of Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS;”38 
(2) an analysis of TRIPS and public health by the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights;39 (3) an official “statement” 
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that 
“intellectual property regimes must be consistent with” the 
rights in the Covenant;40 and (4) a report by the Special 
Rapporteurs on Globalization, which argues that intellectual 
property protection has undermined human rights objectives.41 
Many of these documents and reports contain trenchant 
critiques of TRIPS and of expansive intellectual property rules.  
But some of them also identify shared goals and other points of 
commonality between the two international regimes and seek 
to articulate a human rights approach to TRIPS that reconciles 
states’ treaty obligations.42  So as with indigenous peoples’ 
rights and traditional knowledge, the two approaches to 
reconciling human rights law and intellectual property law 
 
encouraged civil society groups to lobby governments for economic policies that 
fully integrated human rights obligations and “to monitor and publicize the 
effects of economic policies that fail to take such obligations into account.”  Id. 
at ¶ 14. 
 37. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 38. Res. 2001/33, U.N. Comm’n. on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2001/33 (2001). This resolution, sponsored by Brazil, mandates 
that states, in implementing the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health, “adopt legislation or other measures, in accordance with applicable 
international law” to “safeguard access” to such medications “from any 
limitations by third parties.”  Id. at ¶ 3(b); see also Access to Medication in the 
Context of Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, Res. 2002/32, U.N. Comm’n. on 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/2000 (2002); Access to Medication in 
the Context of Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, Res. 2003/29, U.N. Comm’n. on 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/L.11/Add.3 (2003). 
 39. High Commissioner Report, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 10-15, 29-58. 
 40. Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess., 
¶¶ 4, 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (2001). 
 41. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and Its Impact 
on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 53rd Sess., ¶¶ 19-34, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10 (2001). 
 42. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
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each remain in play. 
IV. FUTURE TRAJECTORIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The debate between advocates of a conflict approach and 
those asserting a coexistence approach to the intersection of 
human rights and intellectual property is unlikely to be 
resolved anytime soon.  To the contrary, the continuing tension 
between these two competing frameworks is likely to have at 
least four distinct consequences for the international legal 
system. 
The first effect will be an increased incentive to develop 
soft law human rights norms.  For those advocating the 
primacy of human rights over intellectual property protection 
rules, it is essential to identify precisely which rights are being 
undermined.  Looking simply at treaty texts, however, there 
appear to be few clear-cut conflicts, at least under the narrow 
conflicts rules of customary international law.43  But treaty text 
alone does not tell the whole story.  Human rights law is 
notably elastic, and contains a variety of mechanisms to 
develop more precise legal norms and standards over time.44  
Advocates endorsing a conflictual approach to intellectual 
property are likely to press human rights bodies to develop 
specific interpretations of ambiguous rights to compete with the 
precise, clearly defined rules in TRIPS.45  In addition to 
 
 43. These rules presume that two treaties relating to the same subject 
matter do not conflict and can be implemented by a state that has ratified both 
agreements.  A conflict exists only where treaty rules are mutually 
inconsistent, in the sense that a state’s compliance with one rule necessarily 
compels it to violate another.  See Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the 
Automobile Industry: Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, 
WT/DS59/R & WT/DS64/R at 14-15 (July 2, 1998) available at 
http://www.wto.org. (“[T]echnically speaking, there is a conflict when two (or 
more) treaty instruments contain obligations which cannot be complied with 
simultaneously . . . . Not every such divergence constitutes a conflict, 
however . . . . [i]ncompatibility of contents is an essential condition of 
conflict.”) (quoting 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 468 
(North-Holland 1984)); see also Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in 
International Law: Praises for the Prohibition Against “Clinical Isolation” in 
WTO Dispute Settlement, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 87, 127 n.131 (1999). 
 44. See Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims, supra note 10, at 401-07. 
 45. One important source for such normative genesis will be the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which has already 
adopted an official Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, and 
is currently drafting a General Comment on the same topic to interpret the 
intellectual property provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, 
 58 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 5:1 
 
creating fuel for future conflicts claims,46 this pressure may 
have a side benefit of speeding the jurisprudential evolution of 
economic, social, and cultural rights which is a still 
underdeveloped area of human rights law. 
A second paradigm shift that may emerge is the treatment 
of consumers of intellectual property products as the holders of 
internationally guaranteed rights.  In the world of TRIPS, the 
producers and owners of intellectual property products are the 
only “rights” holders.47  Individuals and groups who consume 
those products are allocated the (implicitly) inferior status of 
users.  A human rights approach to intellectual property, by 
contrast, grants these users a status conceptually equal to 
owners and producers.  This linguistic reframing is not simply 
a matter of semantics.  It also shapes state negotiating 
strategies.  By invoking norms that have received the 
imprimatur of intergovernmental organizations in which 
numerous states are members, governments can more credibly 
argue that a rebalancing of intellectual property standards is 
part of a rational effort to harmonize two competing regimes of 
internationally recognized “rights,” instead of a self-interested 
attempt to distort trade rules or to free ride on foreign creators 
or inventors. 
This leads to a third consequence of the new intersection 
between human rights and intellectual property -- the 
articulation of “maximum standards” of intellectual property 
protection.  Treaties from Berne to Paris to TRIPS are all 
concerned with articulating “minimum standards.”48  But 
 
Social and Cultural Rights.  See supra note 40 (noting Committee’s desire to 
prepare a general comment “as soon as possible”). 
 46. As conflicts among legal rules increase, government negotiators are 
likely to come under increasing pressure to reconcile those conflicts.  In fact, 
much of the intellectual property lawmaking that is occurring in the U.N. 
human rights fora can be seen as an effort to articulate new rules or norms 
that will aid in the future renegotiations of intellectual property standards in 
the WTO or in WIPO.  The disaggregated and non-hierarchical structure of 
international lawmaking institutions makes this kind of strategic behavior 
possible.  For a more detailed discussion, see Laurence R. Helfer, 
Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal System, 37 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2004) (symposium on the emerging transnational 
constitution). 
 47. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at pmbl. (“recognizing that 
intellectual property rights are private rights”). 
 48. See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 1(1) (“Members may, 
but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection 
than is required by this Agreement.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and 
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higher standards are not considered problematic, and nothing 
in the treaties prevents governments from enacting more 
stringent domestic intellectual property laws, or from entering 
into agreements that enshrine such standards.49  Indeed, since 
TRIPS entered into force, the United States and the EC have 
negotiated so-called “TRIPS plus” bilateral agreements with 
many developing countries.50  These treaties impose higher 
standards of intellectual property protection than TRIPS 
requires.51  The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
and the WHO have voiced strong objections to “TRIPS plus” 
treaties on human rights grounds.52  Together with the 
particularization of soft law norms discussed earlier,53 these 
objections may, for the first time, begin to impose a ceiling on 
the upward drift of intellectual property standards that has 
accelerated over the past few decades. 
Whether maximum standards of intellectual property 
protection in fact emerge will depend upon a fourth and final 
issue: how human rights norms are received in established 
intellectual property lawmaking venues such as WIPO and the 
WTO.  In the fall of 2000, the WIPO General Assembly 
approved the creation of a new Intergovernmental Committee 
on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
 
Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 295-304 (1997) 
(emphasizing the importance of TRIPS’ minimum standards framework). 
 49. See Berne Convention supra note 8, at art. 19 (“The provisions of this 
Convention shall not preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of any 
greater protection which may be granted by legislation in a country of the 
Union.”); id. at art. 20 (“The Governments of the countries of the Union 
reserve the right to enter into special agreements among themselves, in so far 
as such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted 
by the Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to this 
Convention.”); see also Paris Convention, supra note 8, at art. 19 (“It is 
understood that the countries of the Union reserve the right to make 
separately between themselves special agreements for the protection of 
industrial property, in so far as these agreements do not contravene the 
provisions of this Convention.”). 
 50. See Genetic Resources Action International, “TRIPs-plus” Through the 
Back Door: How Bilateral Treaties Impose Much Stronger rules for IPRs on 
Life than the WTO (July 2001) at http://www.grain.org (describing bilateral 
agreements negotiated by the United States and the EU that require 
developing countries to adopt more stringent intellectual property rules than 
those found in TRIPS). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See High Commissioner Report, supra note 4, at ¶ 27; WHO Policy 
Perspectives, supra note 4, at 6. 
 53. See supra pp. 57-58. 
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Knowledge and Folklore (IGC).54  The Committee held five 
sessions between September 2000 and July 2003 at which it 
examined a wide array of issues that were omitted from TRIPS 
and that respond to the demands of developing countries and 
indigenous peoples.55  Most recently, the WIPO General 
Assembly extended the Committee’s mandate, authorizing it to 
accelerate its work, which may include the development of new 
international instruments.56  The High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the WHO, and numerous NGOs have been 
granted observer status to take part in the Committee’s 
discussions, creating opportunities to raise human rights 
concerns within that forum.57 
Prospects for integrating human rights into the WTO are 
significantly more uncertain.  The Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health58 adopted in November 2001 
clearly reflects human rights advocacy in the area of access to 
medicines.59  Additionally, the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
directs the TRIPS Council to examine “the relationship 
between [TRIPS] and the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, and other 
relevant new developments raised by Members.”60  Yet the 
United States has so far blocked the CBD Secretariat’s 
application for observer status in the Council, making 
uncertain the fate of a similar application by the High 
 
 54. For a detailed review of the IGC’s work and supporting documents, 
see http://www.wipo.org/globalissues/index.html. 
 55. These issues include: (1) creating searchable databases of contractual 
clauses in material transfer agreements that specify the conditions of access to 
genetic resources and the obligation to share benefits from their use; (2) 
studying the disclosure of biodiversity-related information in patent 
applications; (3) creating databases of traditional knowledge; (4) identifying 
different ways to document traditional knowledge in the public domain; and 
(5) debating the appropriate legal rules to protect traditional knowledge, 
including sui generis systems of protection.  See WIPO Press Release 
PR/2002/317, IGC Moves Ahead on Traditional Knowledge Protection, (June 
25, 2002) available at wipo.org. 
 56. See Press Release PR/2003/362, WIPO, WIPO Member States Agree to 
Fast-Track Work on Traditional Knowledge (Sept. 29, 2003) at 
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/releases/2003/p362.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 
2003). 
 57. See id. 
 58. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doha 
Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess., WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)DEC/2 (2001). 
 59. See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 17. 
 60. Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doha Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess., 
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 ¶ 19 (2001). 
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Commissioner for Human Rights.61  Perhaps more importantly, 
the breakdown of trade talks at the Cancún, Mexico WTO 
ministerial meeting in September 2003 suggests the possibility 
of new rifts between developed and developing countries that 
may make compromises – human rights inspired or otherwise – 
more difficult.62 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Although the debates within the WTO and WIPO will 
surely be contentious, trade and intellectual property 
negotiators should embrace rather than resist opening up these 
organizations to human rights influence.  Allowing greater 
opportunities for airing a human rights perspective on 
intellectual property issues will strengthen the legitimacy of 
these organizations and promote the integration of an 
increasingly dense thicket of legal rules governing the same 
broad subject matter.  Such integration will also allow national 
and international lawmakers and NGOs to turn to the more 
pressing task of defining the human rights-intellectual 
property interface with coherent, consistent, and balanced legal 
norms that enhance both individual rights and global economic 
welfare. 
 
 
 61. See High Commissioner Report, supra note 4, at ¶ 68 (noting that the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights “intends to seek observer status at the 
TRIPS Council”). 
 62. See The WTO Under Fire: Why Did the World Trade Talks in Mexico 
Fall Apart? And Who is to Blame?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 20-26, 2003, at 26, 
26-28; see also Cancun Casts Shadow Over WIPO Assemblies, BRIDGES TRADE 
BIORES, Oct. 3, 2003 at 1 (stating that during debates in the WIPO Assembly 
“developed countries appeared much less willing to make concessions than 
before the Cancún meeting”). 
